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Abstract We document recent trends in gender equality in employment and wages
in Spain. Despite an impressive decline in the gender gap in employment, females
are still less likely to work than males: about 76% of working age males and 63% of
working age females were employed in 2010. If females work they are more likely
to be employed part time and with temporary contracts. The large increase in female
employment, from 28% in 1977 to 63% in 2010, was accompanied by a significant
decline in fertility. The gender gap in wages, after controlling for worker and job
characteristics as well as for selection, is high. It was about 20% in 2010, quite
close to its value in 1994. Furthermore, the gender gap in wages is driven mainly by
differences in returns to individual characteristics. While women are more qualified
than men in observable labor market characteristics, they end up earning less. There
have been several important policy changes that try to help families reconcile family
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responsibilities with market work. The existing literature suggests that households do
react to incentives generated by different policies and policy changes are at least partly
responsible for changes in female labor supply. In recent decades, the large inflow of
immigrants,who provided relatively cheap household services, allowedmore educated
women to enter the labor market. Policy challenges, however, remain.
Keywords Gender employment gap ·Gender wage gap ·Occupational segregation ·
Quantile regressions · Selection · Public policy
JEL Classification J16 · J21 · J22 · J24
1 Introduction
The Spanish labor market experienced a remarkable transformation over the last three
decades as the female employment rate increased from 25 to 63% between 1977 and
2013. Indeed, the decline of the gender employment gap in Spain has been among the
highest in OECD countries (OECD 2008). Nevertheless, the gender gap in employ-
ment, which was close to 19% in 2008, is still one of the highest among OECD
countries, and is surpassed only by two other European Union countries in OECD,
Italy and Greece (OECD 2008). Furthermore, the unemployment rate has been sub-
stantially higher among females than males (10 vs. 5% between 2005 and 2008). The
gender gap in wages also remains high; it was about 20% in 2010.
Furthermore, Spain lags behind otherOECDcountries in coverage andgenerosity of
family policies. The parental leave system is quite restrictive, providing about 16weeks
of maternity and parental paid leave. This is about half of the OECD average and
significantly lower than in countries like France (45.5weeks), Germany (48.8weeks),
or Sweden (46.6weeks).1 Child care remains a significant barrier to the employment
of mothers and public subsidies are limited. The childcare fees for a two-year-old
in 2004 were about 30% of average wages, a figure surpassed only by Luxembourg
and Switzerland among OECD countries (OECD 2007). Spain spends about 1.5% of
its GDP on family benefits (transfers to families and children), while the average for
OECD is about 2.3%.2
The current study has two parts. In Sect. 2 we describe changes in public policy
that were introduced to make family and work more compatible. We also summarize
both empirical and quantitative papers in the literature that analyze the role of different
public policies on female labor market outcomes. In Sect. 3 we document the trends in
employment and genderwage gaps for recent decades and highlight some key findings.
First, we discuss the role of compositional changes in accounting for the reduction
in the gender employment gap. We show that there are important non-compositional
changes that are left to be possibly accounted for changes in public policies and
institutions. For our analysis of employment, we use the Encuesta de Población Activa
1 Source: OECD (2014), OECD Family Database, OECD, Paris (http://www.oecd.org/social/family/
database).
2 Source:OECD(2014),OECDSocial ExpenditureDatabase (SOCX),OECD,Paris(www.oecd.org/social/
expenditure.htm).
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(EPA) data, from 1977 to 2013. Second, using the same data set, we document the
substantial gender segregation in occupationswhich exists in the Spanish labormarket.
Finally,weuse thefirstwave of theEuropeanCommunityHouseholdPanel (ECHP) for
1994, and the cross-sectional component of the European Union Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for 2004 and 2010 to document the gender wage
gap and to explore its determinants. We show that the gender gap in wages is driven
mainly by differences in returns to individual characteristics and that there is positive
self-selection of women into the labor market (so that more productive women are the
ones who choose to work). We also find that both sticky-floor and glass-ceiling effects
on female wages are present. We conclude in Sect. 4.
2 Institutions and policies
Spain went through dramatic institutional changes over the period of analysis. Table 1
provides a chronology of major policy changes. The return to democracy in 1977 and
the entry into the EU in 1986 were accompanied with reforms that changed labor
markets in fundamental ways and affected the evolution of the gender gaps. In this
section we describe these reforms and, based on findings from the existing literature,
discuss their potential effects.
2.1 Family-friendly policies
Child Care Arrangements: The cost and availability of child care is possibly one of
the most important factors determining female labor supply decisions. Between 2005
and 2013 the “care of children or sick adults” together with “other family responsi-
bilities” are the main reasons for women to stay out of the labor market (chosen by
35.0% of respondents), while they do not seem to affect the labor force participation
of males (chosen only by 1.8% of respondents).3 Crespo and Mira (2013) also doc-
ument a negative relation between poor health of parents and employment of their
daughters in Southern European countries (Greece, Italy and Spain), where formal
care arrangements are limited.
An important source of child care is provided by the public education system.
School enrollment rates at early ages have been increasing during last two decades,
mainly due to a major reform of education in 1990 (Ley 1/1990, de 3 de octubre,
named LOGSE) that introduced the possibility for children younger than three to be
enrolled in the public school system. The reform had the largest effect on children who
are three years old as the law requires schools to admit these children whenever their
parents request admission. Indeed, children under three years old are rarely enrolled in
the public education system since public education at this level is not widely available.
As we report in Table 2, the enrollment rate was only 6% for children younger than
one and 35% for two-year-old children in 2007. In contrast, at the age of three, 97%
of children were enrolled, which is significantly higher than it was in 1986 (17%) and
3 Source: Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA). See Sect. 3.1 for further details on EPA data set.
123
64 SERIEs (2014) 5:61–103
Table 1 Policies
1978 Legalization of Contraceptives (Real Decreto 2275/78, de 7 de octubre)
1981 DivorceLaw (Ley 30/1981,de 7 de julio)
1985 Abortion is allowed under certain circumstances (Ley Orgánica 9/85, de 5 de julio)
1989 Extension of paid maternity leave from 14 to 16weeks (Ley 3/1989, de 3 de marzo)
1990 LOGSE: extension of enrollment in public schools to ages 0–3 (Ley 1/1990, de 3 de octubre)
1991 Separate taxation of couples (Ley 18/91, de 6 de junio)
1999 Family friendly package: right to part-time for parents of 0–6& unpaid leave
of up to 3years for parents (Ley 39/1999, de 5 de noviembre)
1999 From tax credit to deduction for children (Real Decreto 214/1999, de 5 de febrero)
2003 Cash benefits to working mothers 0–3 and increase in tax deduction for
children (Ley 46/2002, de 18 de diciembre)
2005 Unilateral divorce (Ley 15/2005, de 8 de julio)
2007 Universal childbenefit (Ley 35/2007, de 15 de noviembre)
2010 Abortion during first 14weeks of pregnancy (Ley Orgánica 2/2010, de 3 de marzo)
Table 2 Enrollment rates by child age
<1year 1year 2years 3years 4years 5years
1986–1987 17 86 100
1991–1992 39 97 100
1996–1997 1 5 12 67 99 100
2001–2002 2 9 21 93 100 100
2007–2008 6 20 35 97 98 99
Source INECSE (http://www.mecd.gob.es/inee/publicaciones/indicadores-educativos/Sistema-Estatal.
html) and Instituto Nacional de Estadística
also above the EU-27 average (75%).4 Nollenberger and Rodriguez-Planas (2011)
study this legislation and show that it led to an 8% increase in the employment of
mothers whose youngest child is three years old. Furthermore, the effect seems to
persist as women who benefited from this policy continue to work more even when
their child is older than three.
In addition to the public school system, privately provided child care services (nurs-
eries or kindergartens) play a crucial role for children younger than 3years old.Accord-
ing to theMinistry of Education, in 2006 the number of children between 0 and 2years
old in private schools was 32%, larger than the number of children in public schools.5
The monthly average price of full-time attendance of private nurseries was about
256euros in 2005, with substantial variation across regions.6
Child care cost may be a key determinant of female labor supply. Attanasio et al.
(2008) found that one of the main driving forces of the increase in married women‘s
4 See Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
5 Ministerio de Educación. Estadística de Enseñanza no Universitaria 2006–2007.
6 Murcia is the cheapest region with 198euros per month while Álava the more expensive with 305 euros.
See Consumer (2005).
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labor supply in the United States (when one compares cohorts of women born in the
1940s and 1950s) was a decrease in child care costs. Encouraging female labor supply
at early ages is important since this may have an impact on their attachment to the
labor market later in life. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that higher female
employment rates at early ages for the youngest cohorts of women in Spain would
generate a sustained increase in female labor supply in the coming years.7 Baizán
(2009) shows that child care availability also has a positive effect on fertility in Spain.
Formal childcare services may be substituted or complemented by informal child-
care provided by family networks. Tobío (2003), based on a survey conducted in 1998,
studies alternative forms of childcare used by parents. She finds that grandparents are
a key part of how parents reconcile family and work. Higher life expectancy together
with low geographical mobility in Spain allows grandparents to have a high level of
involvement with their grandchildren.8 According to this survey, among mothers who
participate in the labormarket, 77% live in the same townwith other relatives, and 56%
ofworkingmothers live in the same town as theirmothers. Among thosewho live in the
same town, 50% live in the same neighborhood. About half (51%) of grandmothers
who live in the same neighborhood as their grandchildren are involved with grand-
children’s care while this figure stands at 38% for those who live in the same town.
A final and important aspect of child care arrangements in Spain is the role of immi-
gration. The number of immigrants has increased dramatically over the last decade in
Spain and the number of immigrants increased from 637,085 (1.6% of population) in
1998 to 5,648,671 (12% of population) in 2009. A substantial fraction of immigrant
women is employed in household services, including both housekeeping and caring for
children and elderly dependents (in many cases as part of the underground economy).
Farré et al. (2011) investigate the effects of immigrants on female labor supply of
highly skilled (college-educated) native women. They find that immigration allowed
women to take shorter children-related breaks from the labor market and enabled later
retirement from the labor force.
Parental Leave Policies: There are three types of policies providing special treatment
for parents at work. First, parents can take 16weeks of paid leave (Ley 3/1989, de 3
de marzo), of which 6weeks have to be enjoyed by the mother. Available empirical
evidence (see for instance Waldfogel et al. (1999), Waldfogel (1998), Ruhm (1998))
suggests that parental leave policies have a positive effect on employment of females
of childbearing age as well as wages since they increase the likelihood that a woman
will return to her employer after childbirth. Within the context of a labor matching
general equilibrium model (Erosa et al. 2010) find that parental leave policies may
have important effects on fertility and labormarket decisions. Finally, Sánchez-Marcos
(2013) explores the quantitative effects a one-year paid maternal leave policy in a life-
7 Bick (2012) studies potential effects of recent reforms in Germany that increase the availability of sub-
sidized child care for mothers and show that they have substantial effects on labor supply of females with
children. Guner et al. (2013) study effects of providing more generous child care subsidies in the US and
show that they can increase married female labor supply significantly.
8 García-Morán and Koehn (2012), using German data, show that women who live close to their parents or
parents-in-law are more likely to have children and more likely to work. They face, however, lower wages
as the child care provided by the grandparents restricts women’s geographic job mobility.
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cycle model of labor supply and savings, and finds that there are substantial effects on
the employment rate of mothers of young children, although employment rates later
in life are not affected. While job protection associated with maternal leave also has a
positive effect on wages, this effect is dominated by selection as the increase in female
labor supply results in lower productivity women entering the labor force.
In addition to paid parental leave, mothers can enjoy 1h of leave per day for breast-
feeding (up to nine months after birth). Mothers are allowed, in general, to accumulate
these hours to extend the paid parental leave.
Second, a new lawwas passed in 1999 (Ley 39/1999, de 5 de noviembre, namedLaw
toPromote theConciliation ofWork andFamilyLife) that specifically aimed at helping
to balance family and work. This new law introduced the possibility of family-friendly
arrangements between the worker and the firm. In particular, the law allows parents to
ask for an unpaid leave of up to three years after a birth. However, the same job position
is only guaranteed if the spell is shorter than one year. After that period only a job
of similar category is guaranteed. These unpaid leaves are taken into account for the
seniority calculation and thus they do not affect negatively automatic wage increases
or severance payments. Furthermore, the recent Law on Equal Opportunities between
Women and Men (Ley 3/2007, de 22 de marzo) increased the duration of unpaid
parental leave that is counted for retirement social security benefits from 1 to 2years.
Lapuerta et al. (2010) explore the incidence of unpaid parental leave among workers.
They show that only about 46% of women with children under 3years were entitled
to parental leave in 2006 since most Spanish women leave the labor market during the
first few years of maternity. Furthermore, even among those who qualify, the use of
parental leave is very limited, comprising only 3% of entitled mothers in December
2006. Among parents who use the benefits, women are much more likely to be on
parental leave than men (only five of every 100 parents using benefits are men).
Among women, those with full-time permanent contracts and high level of education
are more likely to enjoy unpaid parental leave. However, unpaid parental leaves are
shorter among high educated women than among low educated ones.
Flexibility at Work for Parents: The Law to Promote the Conciliation of Work and
Family Life also allows parents of children under the age of 7 to reduce their daily
hours worked. In particular, the law makes it illegal to fire a worker if she/he asked
for a reduction in hours in the past. In practice, the law mainly protects workers with
permanent contracts since the employer is not forced to renew a fixed-term contract.
Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas (2013) found that this law indeed encouraged
the primary caregiver (usually mothers) to remain employed in part-time work. They
also find, however, that the law had adverse effect on female employment, as firms
became less likely to hire childbearing-aged women and to promote them into good
jobs, and more likely to let them go relative to their male counterparts.
In response to the low incidence of part-time work during the nineties, a law aimed
at promoting flexibility of hours worked was passed in 1998 (Ley 15/1998, de 27
de noviembre). The new law focused on removing discrimination against part-time
workers as compared to full-time workers in terms of social welfare protection and
favoring job stability of part-time contracts. In spite of this, Blázquez and Ramos
(2009) find that part-time employment in Spain is mainly related to the difficulty that
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Fig. 1 Distributions of the timing of work in various European countries
part-timers face in finding full-time jobs (which contrasts with the Netherlands where
workers seem to voluntarily choose to work part-time). Furthermore, in Spain females
are 2.6 times less likely than males to switch from part- to full-time employment,
whereas Dutch females are not less likely than their male counterparts to increase the
number of hours they work.
Finally, another possible impediment of female employment is the way the work
day is organized in Spain. Work schedules in Spain are typically split and consist of
5h of work in the morning (from 9 a.m. to 2 p.m.), followed by a 2h break at lunch
time and another 3h of work in the afternoon/evening (from 4 p.m. to 7 p.m.). Figure 1
shows the fraction of adult population (ages 16 and above) who work at a given time
of the day in Norway, Spain and the UK in 2000. In all countries, a very small fraction
of the population is at work before 8.00 a.m. and the fraction is highest between 9.00
a.m. and 16.00 p.m.. There are two features that distinguish Spain from the other two
countries. First, a larger fraction of people have a lunch break. Second, while in the
other countries a very small fraction, less than 10%, is still working at 6.00 p.m.,
almost 40% of the population is still at work in Spain. The picture is very similar if
one looks at males and females separately. The split work schedule and longer hours
imply additional costs for parents.Comparingworkerswith differentwork schedules in
Spain, Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica (2006) find that most women are constrained
in their work schedules, i.e. they would rather work a continuous schedule, and do not
find evidence of a compensating wage differential for having a split work schedule.
Cash Benefits for Working Mothers and Children: With the aim of reconciling
family and work, a monthly cash benefit for working mothers of children aged less
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than three years oldwas introduced in 2003 (Ley 46/2002 de 18 de diciembre de 2002).
The monthly cash benefit amounted to 100 Euros per child aged less than three years
old. To be eligible, working mothers must fulfill certain conditions in relation to the
number of hours worked.9 The cash benefit is sizeable; it represents about 30% of the
average cost of private day-care centers in Spain. Compared to the working females’
observed earnings, it is about 13% of a primary educated female’s monthly earnings,
8% of a secondary educated one or 5% of a college educated one.10 The 2003 reform
also increased the tax deduction for children.
Sánchez-Mangas and Sánchez-Marcos (2008) show that cash benefits indeed led
to a 5% increase in the employment rate of eligible women and the effect was more
pronounced among less educated women. Azmat and González (2010) also explore
the effect of the combined policy (of cash benefits and higher tax deductions) on
fertility and mothers’ employment. They estimate policy changes increased birth rates
by about 5% (or by about three births per 1,000 women) and employment of mothers
with children under three by about 2%. By allowing women to work and accumulate
labor market experience, this policy might also have longer-run effects on female
employment that are difficult to measure.
2.2 Other institutional changes
Changing Divorce Laws: It was not until 1981 that divorce was legalized (Ley
30/1981) in Spain and although there were somemarital separations before the law had
been passed, they were rare. More recently, a reform of the law established unilateral
divorce in 2005 (Ley 15/2005). As a consequence of these laws the cost of marital
dissolution has gone down over the last decades, the crude divorce rate increased from
0.3 divorces per 1000 in 1981to 2.2 divorces per 1000 in 2010.11
Several papers in the literature found a positive impact of marital dissolution risk
on women’s employment using reduced form analysis for the United States (see,
among others, Johnson and Skinner (1986), Sander (1985), Parkman (1992), Sen
(2000)). In the context of a structural model, Caucutt et al. (2002) explore howmarried
women consider the effect of motherhood and labor supply on the prospects of future
outside-marriage options once divorce is allowed and find that this is important in
order to understand labor supply and fertility patterns in the United States. Hence,
it is reasonable to expect that the series of reforms concerning marital dissolution
might be one of the factors behind the transition in female employment and fertility
9 These conditions differ for full-time and part-time working mothers. In particular, full-time female work-
ers must work at least 15days per month. For part-time female workers the equivalent figure is 20days.
Furthermore, part-time female workers are eligible only if they work at least 50% of full-time hours. There
is an upper limit to the cash benefit given by the annual social security payroll taxes, but the benefit is not
income tested (see Ley 46/2002 de 18 de diciembre de 2002).
10 Families with children (whether the mother works or not) are also eligible for a cash benefit per child
(Ley 24/1997) if the child is younger than 18years old or if the child suffers from any type of disability.
This subsidy is, however, means tested and the income threshold is quite low (about 7,000Euros annual
income in 2000).
11 Source: Eurostat Marriage and Divorce Statistics.
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decisions. Of course, divorce risk cannot be considered an exogenous shock. A higher
female attachment to the labor force may have contributed to the increase in marital
dissolutions, as it enhances outside-marriage opportunities for women.
The impact of divorce on female labor supply might depend on how property is
divided upon divorce (Gray 1998; Stevenson 2008). Kapan (2008) studies the effect
of a law implemented in 2000 in England and Wales that favored the financially
disadvantaged spouse by entitling him/her to a higher share of total assets at divorce.
Using the British Household Panel Survey 1991–2006, he finds that married women
reduced their labor supply between 2 to 3h per week after the law had changed. For
Spain, Brassiolo (2012) studies the effect of changes in laws governing the division of
family assets at divorce on the probability of divorce and on female labor supply in two
regions of Spain (Catalonia and Balearic Islands). In these two regions, a 1993 reform
introduced an economic compensation for the financially weaker spouse upon divorce.
In 1998, however, another change allowed marital contracts to include provisions
regulating the dissolution of marriage, possibly counterbalancing the reform of 1993.
Hefinds thatwhile the first change led to a decrease in female employment andworking
hours (as the provision improved the bargaining position of women within marriages),
the second change was associated with higher employment and working hours.
Taxation: Several tax reformshavebeenundertaken inSpain since the personal income
tax was introduced for the first time in 1979. Some of these reforms have potentially
affected household decisions to some extent, particularly fertility and female labor
supply. Until 1991 (Ley 18/91, de 6 de junio)married coupleswere required to file joint
returns and, as a consequence, their incomes were subject to a higher marginal tax rate.
However, a deduction from the tax liability for married households and an additional
deduction for two-earner households were applied. As a result, married couples was
treated asymmetrically depending on the number of earners. After this date, married
couples were allowed to choose between joint and individual taxation. As it has been
shown in Kaygusuz (2010) for the case of the US, this may have a substantial impact
on female labor market participation. In fact, Gutiérrez-Domenech (2005) shows that
the transition towards separate taxation has positively affected mothers’ probability of
post-birth employment in Spain. A second important change in tax policy took place
in 1999 (Real Decreto 214/1999, de 5 de febrero) and changed how family structure
affects tax calculations. Before 1999 there was a deduction from tax liabilities for
dependent children. Since 1999 deductions for family size have been applied directly
to taxable income, and the tax liability is calculated for household income net of
deductions. As a result, tax savings per child is now increasing in the marginal tax
rate. As we mentioned above, a reform in 2003 increased the tax deduction applied
based on the number of children and the tax deduction for each child aged less than
three years old.12 According to Azmat and González (2010) the effect of the increase
in child deductions on mothers’ employment was negative.
12 Before the policy, family annual taxable income was reduced by 1,200euros each for the first and second
child and by 1,800 for the third child and subsequent children. After the policy was introduced, families
have been able to reduce their annual taxable income by 1,400 euros for the first child, 1,500 euros for the
second child, 2,200 for the third child and, finally, 2,300 for each subsequent child. Furthermore, the tax
deduction for having a child under 3years went up from 300 to 1,200 euros per child.
123
70 SERIEs (2014) 5:61–103
Affirmative Action Policies: In March 2007 the Spanish Government passed the
Equality Law (Ley 3/2007, de 22 de marzo) imposing gender parity in all selection
committees in the state administration, party lists and those firms and organizations
depending on the public administration.13 The justification of such a policy lies on
the potential discrimination against women by the evaluation committees. However,
it is not obvious to what extent this type of measure would increase the chances of
females filling top positions in the public sector. In fact, Bagues and Esteve-Volart
(2010) analyze how the chances of success of 150,000 female and male candidates
(from 1987 to 2007) for positions in the four main Corps of the Spanish Judiciary
were affected by the gender composition of their evaluation committee. They find that
a female (male) candidate was significantly less likely to be hired whenever she (he)
was randomly assigned to a committee in which the share of female (male) evaluators
was relatively greater. Their evidence suggests that this was related to the fact that
female majority committees overestimated the quality of male candidates.
Contraceptive methods and abortion: As emphasized by Goldin and Katz (2002)
among others, the ability of females to control their fertility decisions may have a sub-
stantial impact on their career planning and on fertility rates. During the dictatorship
the use of contraceptive methods was penalized by law. This changed in 1978 (Real
Decreto 2275/78 de 7 de octubre), and over the last three decades the use of con-
traceptive methods has been widely spread across the population to control fertility.
The contraceptive prevalence rate (percentage of women who are practicing or whose
sexual partners are practicing any form of contraception, usually measured for married
women ages 15–49) went up from 54% in 1983 to 76% in 1993, and today is compa-
rable to other developed countries (Carro andMira 2006).14 Additionally, the first Law
regulating abortion in Spain was introduced in 1985 (Ley Orgánica 9/85 de 5 de julio
1985).According to this Lawabortionwas allowed only during the first threemonths of
pregnancy and under certain circumstances, such as mother’s health risk (either phys-
ical or mental), fetus risk or rape. It is not until March 2010 (Ley Orgánica 2/2010de
3 de marzo) that a new law was passed in the Parliament establishing that during the
first 14weeks of pregnancy women are free to interrupt a pregnancy. The number of
abortions went up from about 20 thousand in 1987 to 112 thousand in 2012.15
Fertility subsidies: A universal child benefit was introduced in 2007 aimed at pro-
moting fertility in Spain (Ley 35/2007, de 15 de noviembre). The one-time payment
benefit of 2,500euros, to be paid to the mother immediately after birth, was about
4.5 times the monthly gross minimum wage of a full-time worker. González (2013)
13 Private corporations also received governmental guidelines in order to increase participation of women
on boards.
14 Carro and Mira (2006) estimate a dynamic stochastic discrete choice model of contraceptive decisions.
They show that an exogenous delay in the age of marriage can substantially reduce fertility. In particular,
an increase in the age of marriage, from age 23 to ages 27 or 30 reduces the expected number of births from
2.08 to 1.86 or 1.65, respectively.
15 According to the Ministerio de Sanidad, Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Johnston archive (http://
www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/abortion/).
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Fig. 2 Unemployment rate
finds that annual number of births increased by about 6 percent as a result of the policy.
This was in part through a reduction in abortions. Eligible mothers also stayed out of
the labor force longer after childbirth, which led to their children spending less time
in formal child care.
3 Gender gaps
The aim of this section is to provide a detailed picture of gender gaps in employment
andwages in Spain, and document how they evolved in recent decades. Before present-
ing an account of gender gaps, however, we first discuss two key features of Spanish
labor markets. First, during the last few decades the unemployment rate has been quite
high (it averaged about 12% formen and 18% forwomen between 1977 and 2013) and
exhibited large fluctuations, reaching above 20% during recessions in the late 1980s
and early 1990s (Fig. 2).16 Females are much more likely to be unemployed than
males, the unemployment rate of females was twice as high as that of males.17 This
pattern changed in the last recession as the male unemployment rate increased more
16 See Berge and Jorda (2013) for a chronology of Spanish business cycles.
17 According to Azmat et al. (2006), the gender gap in unemployment in Spain was the highest among
the OECD countries in 1999. They find that there is a gender gap in both flows from employment into
unemployment and from unemployment into employment, and that differences in human capital accumu-
lation between men and women interacted with labor market institutions is important to account for these
differences.
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Fig. 3 Fraction of temporary workers
than the female unemployment rate and they were essentially identical by 2013.18
Second, as Fig. 3 shows, the fraction of temporary (fixed-term) workers has grown
since the end of the eighties as a result of a series of labor market reforms that were
introduced to combat unemployment.19 In 2008 the fraction of the labor force with
temporary contracts was 29.3% in Spain, while the OECD average was only 11.8%
(OECD 2010a). Furthermore, the incidence of temporary contracts among women is
higher than among men. The last recession decreased the fraction of temporary con-
tracts as most of the adjustment in the labor force was made through workers with
temporary contracts that have much lower firing costs.20 The overall increase in the
prevalence of temporary contracts since the end of the eighties implies an increase in
employment and income uncertainty that households face during the period of analy-
sis. This uncertainty was somehow mitigated by the large increase in public sector
18 A similar pattern is also observed in the U.S.—see Sahin et al. (2010).
19 In 1984 the Labor LawReform relaxed the conditions for firms to hireworkers under fixed term contracts.
Firms could hire fixed-term employees subject to a severance pay of 12days’ wages per year of service
for any kind of job (with contract duration between 6months and 3years and compulsory conversion into
permanent thereafter). Workers with permanent contracts are entitled to severance pay of 20days’ wages
per year of service (up to a maximum of 12months’ wages) in fair dismissals and to 45 days’ (up to a
maximum of 42months’) wages in unfair dismissals. In spite of several reforms (in 1994, 1997, 2002, and
2006) aimed at fighting the prevalence of temporary employment, the fraction of temporary contracts in the
mid-2000s was above 30%.
20 See Bentolila et al. (2010) and Costain et al. (2010) for an analysis of the role of temporary contracts in
the last recession in Spain.
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Fig. 4 Fraction of workers in the public sector
employment up to the early 1990s, but since then there has been a significant drop in
public sector employment, further exacerbating the uncertainties that women face in
the labor market (see Fig. 4).
3.1 Employment
In order to document gender employment gaps and their evolution over time, we use
the Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA) data, from 1977 to 2013. These surveys are
run by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), the Spanish Statistical Agency, and
constitute the Spanish part of Labor Force Statistics of OECD. Each survey consists
of a representative sample of about 60,000 households and contains labor market
information of all individuals older than 16 that belong to each household. Although
the information on labor market outcomes is quite detailed; the surveys do not contain
information on wages.21 We focus on individuals between ages 25 and 54 in order to
concentrate on individuals who have already completed their education and to leave
aside the effect of early retirement decisions on employment (an important feature of
the Spanish labor market).22
21 Although there have been some methodological changes over the period of analysis, as documented by
Cuadrado et al. (2007), the basic structure of EPA remained unchanged over this period.
22 See García-Pérez et al. (2010).
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Fig. 5 Educational attainment
3.1.1 Cross sectional analysis
We start by documenting cross-sectional changes in the educational attainment of
the population, employment and unemployment rates, and hours of work for men
and women. The most remarkable change during this period was the increase in the
educational attainment. As Fig. 5 documents, about 80% of the population had less
than upper secondary education (high school) by the end of the 1970s. In 2013, the
population with less than upper secondary education declined to 43%, and about
23% of the population had a college degree (more than four times the level at the
beginning of the period). Indeed, by the end of the sample period, the fraction of
the population with tertiary education in Spain reached levels similar to the OECD
average, about 28% in 2008 (OECD 2010b).23 The fraction of the population with
less than upper secondary education is, however, about 20 percentage points higher
(and correspondingly the fraction of individuals with upper secondary education is 20
percentage points lower) than the OECD average (OECD 2010b).
It is quite remarkable that the college attainment gender gap (ratio of women to
men with college education) has also declined and was eventually reversed, from 0.6
in 1977 to 1.4 in 2013.24 However, there are still substantial gender differences in
23 Tertiary education includes not only college education but also other programs that focus on practical,
technical or occupational skills for direct entry into the labormarket.As a result, the fraction of the population
with tertiary education is higher than the fraction with a university degree.
24 According to OECD (2010b), the tertiary education gender gap was 0.97 in 2010.
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the college degrees that are pursued by men and women. According to the Instituto
Nacional de Estadística (INE), more than 80% of those who were registered in college
degrees related to “Teaching” were women, whereas the figure was lower than 30%
in those college degrees related to “Engineering”.25
Together with educational attainment, the female employment rate (employment to
population ratio) increased dramatically over this period, whereas male employment
rate declined slightly (Fig. 6a). In 1977, about 28% of women between ages of 25
and 54 worked, while by the end of the sample period more than 61% of them did
so. With the increase in the female employment rate, the gender employment gap was
reduced from 65% in 1977 to 9% in 2013. As we noted above, the last recession had
an asymmetric effect on men and women. In particular, men were more likely to lose
their jobs. As a result, part of the decline in the gender employment gap might be
transitory, reflecting particular effects of the recent crisis on labor markets. In contrast
to the gap in employment, the gender gap in hours worked (conditional on working)
has been widening over this period and in particular since the 1990s (Fig. 7a). In 1977,
menworked on average about 5h per weekmore than women, while the gap was about
7h in 2013. This reflects the fact that some fraction of women who entered the labor
force took part-time jobs. Figure 6b shows that females are more likely to be working
in part time jobs than males and that the gap has been increasing in recent years.26
In 2013, 26% of females were working part-time in contrast with 7% for males.27
As Fig. 7b shows, however, there has also been a slight widening of the gap between
working hours of full-time workers, further contributing to the increasing gender gap
in hours worked.
We next look at changes in employment rates conditional on educational attain-
ment, marital status and the number of children to understand whether changes in
female employment were driven by the behavior of some specific groups. One of
the driving forces of the changes in female employment rate could be the change in
educational composition of the female population, as there are substantial differences
in employment rates across educational groups. Figure 8a shows, however, that the
female employment rate increased for all educational levels, and that the increase is
indeed more prominent for women with less than upper secondary education. During
the period of analysis, with the changing patterns of marriage and fertility, women
also became more likely to be unmarried or married without any children in recent
years. The fraction of married women in our sample decreases from 84 to 60%, and
the fraction of unmarried mothers in our sample increased from 4 to 17% between
1977 and 2013. Since unmarried women and women without any children are more
likely to work, this could have important implications for the average behavior. The
25 See Estadística de Enseñanza Universitaria 2008/2009, published by INE (http://www.ine.es/inebmenu/
mnu_educa.htm).
26 The increase in the fraction of part-time contracts in 2005 is due to changes in the survey questions of
the Labor Force Survey carried out by the Statistical Institute. In particular, new questions were included
in the survey aimed at identifying individuals working fewer hours.
27 Still, the incidence of part-time employment is quite lower than in other EU countries. In 2009, part-time
employment as a fraction of total employment was about 21% in Spain, whereas it was above 30% in most
of the EU countries (OECD 2010c).
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Fig. 6 Employment rate and fraction of part-time workers
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Fig. 7 Workers’s average weekly hours of work
increase in the overall employment rate of females, however, has been mainly driven
by the increase in the employment rate of married females (Fig. 8b). Their employ-
ment rate increased from 22% in 1977 to 59% in 2013. Furthermore, the increase in
females’ (married and unmarried) employment rate is independent of the number of
children they have (Fig. 8c). Even for females with more than 2 children, the employ-
ment rate increased from 18 to 49%. The employment rate of mothers also seems to
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be independent of the age of their youngest child (Fig. 9).28 Since there has been a
significant change in the educational attainment of the female population, it is more
informative to look at the employment rate conditioning on education. As Fig. 9b–
d show, for females with college education the increase has been similar regardless
of the age of the youngest child, whereas for those with less than college education
the increase started earlier for mothers with children older than three and has been
more pronounced. Furthermore, we observe that the increase for mothers of children
younger than three starts in the mid-nineties, which coincides with a large increase in
the enrolment rates of three-years-old children we detailed in Sect. 2.
The existing literature has focused on education and fertility as possible determi-
nants of female employment. Arellano and Bover (1995) use a time series model of
female labor force participation and conclude that the increase in women’s education
and the decrease in birth rates (after controlling for endogeneity by treating educa-
tion and fertility endogenous) are the main factors underlying the increase in female
labor supply during the period 1976–1991. Although these two factors (education
and fertility) must certainly play an important role, as we have shown above, even
when we condition on education and children, there has been a significant increase
in female employment after 1990s.There is some further evidence that child bearing
is an important determinant of female labor force participation. Gutiérrez-Domenech
(2005) uses the Family and Fertility Survey produced by the United Nations to explore
women’s transitions from employment to non-employment after first birth in several
European countries (Spain, Belgium, W. Germany, Italy and Sweden). She finds that
Spain, together with Germany, are the countries that experienced the greatest drop in
post-birth employment rates. Furthermore, the drop is persistent even 10years after
childbearing.
3.1.2 Cohort analysis
In order to provide a more comprehensive picture of female labor supply behavior, we
now document life-cycle employment profiles for three cohorts of individuals. This is
important since labor supply is a dynamic decision and low labor market attachment
early in the working life may determine labor market participation later on, due to
returns to labor market experience and depreciation of human capital.29 As a result,
changes in working conditions might affect female behavior with a delay. We focus
on three cohorts and compare the behavior of those born at the beginning of the fifties
(between 1950 and 1954), to those born at the beginning of the sixties (between 1960
and 1964) and those born at the beginning of seventies (between 1970 and 1974).
We are able to observe the first (oldest) cohort from ages 25 to 55, the second cohort
from ages 25 to 50 and the third (youngest) cohort from ages 25 to 40. As Fig. 10a
28 This is in contrastwithwhatweobserve in other countries,where there are significant differences between
the employments rate of mothers of children aged 0 to 3 and mothers with older children. According to the
OECD (2007) Spanish females’ employment rate gap with respect to the average of the OECD countries
was 2.8 percentage points. However, the gap is increasing with the age of the youngest child. It ranges from
1.3 percentage points if the youngest child is younger than 2, to 6.9 if the child is 3 to 5years old, and to
15.6 if the child is 6 to 16years old.
29 See Olivetti (2006) and Miller (2011) on the effects of career interruptions on female wages.
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Fig. 8 Employment rate of females
shows, life-cycle labor supply behavior of these three cohorts of females differ quite
significantly.
First, the three cohorts differ both in terms of labor market attachment and in how
their labor supply changes with age. Females in cohort 2 are more likely to work
than those in cohort 1 at any age and cohort 3 is more likely to work than cohort 2.30
Furthermore, for cohort 1 there is an important decline in employment rates during
child bearing ages, while this decline is much less visible for cohort 2 and disappears
completely for the youngest cohort. Indeed a comparison of female and male life-
cycle behavior for the youngest cohort shows that the shape of their employment-age
profiles is very similar (Fig. 10).31 Figure 11a shows that it is among those women
30 Part of this increase from the second to the third cohort might simply reflect time effects, as the 1990s
was a period of rapid growth.
31 See Attanasio et al. (2008) for a similar pattern in employment-age profiles in the U.S.
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Fig. 9 Employment rate of mothers by age of the youngest child. The sample consists of 25–54years old
household heads and their partners and spouses
with upper secondary education or less where we observe more substantial differences
across cohorts. Furthermore, the main difference between these cohorts originates in
the behavior of married females (Fig. 12) and this is independent of the number of
children they have (Fig. 13). Second, if we look at males, Fig. 10b shows that younger
cohorts (cohorts 2 and 3) have much lower employment rates than cohort 1.
This reflects partly the delay in labor market entry of younger cohorts, as these
cohorts are more educated than the older one. It also reflects the high level of youth
unemployment in Spain. Finally, as Fig. 14 shows, whereas about 25% of women
from cohort 1 and 2 benefited from working in the public sector since the beginning
of their working life (the percentage is even higher later in life), the figure is lower
than 15% for women who belong to cohort 3.
An important difference between these three cohorts is their fertility behavior (both
the number as well as the timing of children). Starting in the early 1980s, Spain
experienced a dramatic decline in fertility. As Fig. 15a shows, the total number of
births per 1,000 women aged 15–49 has declined from 80 to 40 between 1975 and
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Fig. 10 Employment rates of cohorts. Cohort 1 born between 1950 and 1954, Cohort 2 born between 1960
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Fig. 12 Employment rate of cohorts of females by marital status. Cohort 1 born between 1950 and 1954,
Cohort 2 born between 1960 and 1964, Cohort 3 born between 1970 and 1974
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Fig. 14 Fraction of females working in the public sector by cohorts. Cohort 1 born between 1950 and
1954, Cohort 2 born between 1960 and 1964, Cohort 3 born between 1970 and 1974
1993 and has remained low since then. As a result, Spain had a very low (around
1.2) Total Fertility Rate (TFR) by the end of the 1990s, which has been reversed in
recent years (TFR in 2007 was 1.4), mainly due to the large inflow of immigrants in
the 2000s.32 As females started to have fewer children, they also started to have them
later in life, and the mean age at first birth has increased from 25years in 1977 to
29years in 2007 (Fig. 15b). Part of this shift must reflect more widespread availability
of contraception.
It is, however, not clear whether changing fertility patterns had an impact on female
employment behavior. First, fertility started to decline in the mid 1970s (almost imme-
diately after Spain’s transition to democracy), while female employment started to
grow about a decade later. Second, the literature that studies the interaction between
fertility and labor market outcomes in Spain often concludes that it is the labor mar-
ket that affects fertility behavior and not the other way around. Ahn and Mira (2001)
estimate a discrete time hazard model of the probability of marriage and childbearing
and conclude that the high incidence of unemployment and temporary jobs in Spain
had a very strong negative effect on these outcomes.33 Da Rocha and Fuster (2006)
32 Source: http://www.oecd.org/els/familiesandchildren/40192107.pdf.
33 The negative impact of temporary contracts is also supported by the analysis in De la Rica and Iza (2005)
and Adeserá (2006). Gutiérrez-Domenech (2008) finds that the increase in the incidence of unemployment
among men tends to delay marriage and then fertility. Alba et al. (2009) estimate the causal effect of female
labor market status on fertility using Spanish data. They find a positive although non-significant effect of
participation and employment on the probability of having the first child, once the endogeneity is accounted
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Fig. 15 Number of births per 1,000 women (15–49years old) and average age at first child birth
develop a quantitative theory of fertility and labor market participation decisions in
order to explore the impact of labor market frictions (low probability of finding a job)
on the observed positive correlation between fertility and employment among OECD
countries.34
3.1.3 Do changes in the composition of population account for the increase
in female employment rate?
It is a challenging task to determine what the driving forces of these changes are. In
principle, compositional changes in the population may account for at least a fraction
of the increase in female employment rate. As we have seen, young cohorts of women
are more educated, more likely to be unmarried and have fewer children, all factors
that make them more likely to work.
Counterfactual Employment Levels: In order to gain some insight into the effects of
compositional changes on the female employment rate we first carry out the following
counterfactual exercise. The female employment rate was 25.0% in 1985 and 59.9%
for using a switching probit model with endogenous switching. Finally, De la Rica and Ferrero (2003)
estimate the effect of fertility on participation under the existence of unobserved characteristics that affect
both fertility and participation (fertility decisions are endogenous to the participation decision) and find that
the effect is negative and very strong.
34 Da Rocha and Fuster (2006) find that unemployment induces females to postpone and space births,
resulting in a lower total fertility rate. Adeserá (2011) uses fluctuations in unemployment rates across
European countries during the eighties and the nineties to investigate their effect on childbearing. She finds
that high and persistent unemployment in a country is associated with delays in childbearing (and second
births).
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Table 3 Employment rate under counterfactual distributions of observables
Employment rate (%) Difference with respect
to 1985 (%)
Data 1985 25.0
Data 2005 59.9 34.9
Counterfactual rate in 1985 with education
distribution of 2005
37.5 12.5
Counterfactual rate in 1985 with marital
status distribution of 2005
29.4 4.4
Counterfactual rate in 1985 with number of
children distribution of 2005
28.8 3.8
Counterfactual rate in 1985 with education,
marital status, and the number of children
distribution of 2005
42.7 17.7
Source Encuesta Poblacion Activa (EPA) 1985, 2005. Sample includes prime working age 25–54 heads of
the household and partners or spouses of the heads
in 2005.35 We calculate what the employment rate in 2005 would be if the population
had the educational attainment, marital status and the number of children of 2005
but faced the employment rates of 1985. Table3 shows that if only the distribution
of education had changed, the employment rate in 2005 would have been 37.5%. It
would have been 29.4% if only the distribution of marital status had changed and,
finally, 28.8% if only the distribution of number of children had changed. All the
compositional changes together would have generated 17.7 additional percentages
points of employment in 2005, about half of the actual increase since 1985. The rest
potentially reflects other factors, such as the public policies and institutional changes
outlined above.
Employment Regressions:We next estimate a linear probabilitymodel of the employ-
ment decision for the period 1977 to 2013. The results are reported in Table4. We start
in column I with a simple specification with a gender dummy variable that takes a
value of one if the worker is female, a time trend, and a time trend interacted with the
gender dummy variable. Then we progressively introduce different control variables
that may be responsible for the employment rate gender gap as well as its trend. The
coefficient of the gender dummy in regression I captures the average gross gender
employment gap that we saw in the earlier figures, and the time trend interacted with
the gender dummy reflects the closing gender gap pattern. Hence, on average females
were about 66% less likely to be employed thanmales between 1977 and 2013, but this
gap has been declining by about 1.5 percentage points every year. Results in columns
II–VII, where we include different demographic controls, highlight different factors
that contribute to the declining gender gap in employment.
First, the employment gap is larger for younger females (column II). Second, the
gap is substantially higher for married women than for singles, and married women
35 We compare 1985 and 2005 because the increase in female labor supply started during the mid-eighties
and we want to avoid the comparison with years affected by the last recession. Furthermore, for these
counterfactuals we restrict the sample to heads of households and their partners and spouses. As a result
the employment rates in Table3 differ slightly from ones we have reported above.
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Table 4 Linear probability model for employment (1977–2013)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Female −0.663∗∗∗ −0.348∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Time trend −0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time trend*female 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.003∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age*time trend 0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age*female −0.008∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age*time
trend*female
−0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.209∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Married*time
trend
−0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married*female −0.593∗∗∗ −0.593∗∗∗ −0.543∗∗∗ −0.542∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Married*time
trend*female
0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Kids −0.014∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Kids*time trend −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗ −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Kids*female −0.007∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Kids*time
trend*female
−0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Edu2 0.048∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Edu3 −0.017∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Edu2*time trend 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Edu3*time trend 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Edu2*female 0.081∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
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Table 4 continued
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Edu3*female 0.332∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Edu2*time
trend*female
0.000∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Edu3*time
trend*female
−0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Immigrant 0.250∗∗∗
(0.009)
Immigrant*time
trend
−0.011∗∗∗
(0.000)
Immigrant*female −0.211∗∗∗
(0.013)
Immigrant*time
trend*female
0.009∗∗∗
(0.000)
Constant 0.871∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of
observations
2690794 2690794 2690794 2690794 2690794 2690794
Adjusted
Pseudo-R2
0.176 0.182 0.211 0.219 0.247 0.248
Source Encuesta Poblacion Activa (EPA) 1977–2013. (i) The omitted category is taken as illiterate for
education dummies. (ii) Standard errors are in parenthesis.*, ** and *** indicate significant at 0.01, 0.05
and 0.10 significance level respectively
are almost 60% less likely to be employed than single women (column III). The neg-
ative effect of marriage, however, has been declining over time. Third, the presence
of children reduces employment probability for both men and women, but the effect
is more pronounced for the latter (column IV). Furthermore, the negative effect of
kids on females increased over time.36 Fourth, employment probability is increasing
in female’s education, and quite remarkably so for women with college education
(column V). However, over the period of analysis the positive effect of female’s col-
lege education decreases. Finally, while immigrants are about 25% more likely to be
employed than natives, immigrant women are less likely to be employed than immi-
grant men (column VI). Hence, while immigrant women, as we mentioned above,
might provide household services and allow highly-educated native women to work,
there is a simple composition effect that increases gender employment gap. Immigrant
women, however, are becoming more likely to be employed over time.
36 One should be careful in interpreting these numbers because of the potential endogeneity of the fertility
decision, in particular given the dramatic changes in the total fertility rate that we documented for this
period in the Spanish economy.
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While the estimated coefficient for the time trend interactedwith the gender dummy
is about 0.015 in the regression without demographic controls (column I), it declines
to 0.003 when we also control for marital status (column III). The trend, however,
is now captured in the variable that interacts the time trend with the married female
dummy. Hence, married women are more likely to be employed over time during the
period of analysis. This result is robust to the inclusion of other demographics. This
suggests that there are other factors, apart from changes in demographics, that are
behind the observed increasing trend of married female employment. Both policies
that make employment more affordable and attractive for women as well as institu-
tional/social changes, such as rise in divorce, that make women more willing to be
attached to the labor market and build human capital, can be responsible for these
trends.
3.1.4 Occupational segregation
Gender segregation across occupations or the tendency for men and women to be
employed in different occupations is another important aspect of gender inequality. If
men and women are employed in different occupations and if, for example, women are
more concentrated in low-paying jobs, this will be reflected in gender wage equality,
as we explore in Sect. 3.2.We study differences in the occupational distribution ofmen
and women in Spain and the trends in gender segregation across occupations based on
EPA from 1994 to 2013.37 In Table5, the first column in each year displays the share of
female workers within a particular occupation while female concentration represents
the distribution of females across occupations for that year.38 As Table5 documents,
occupations in services such as clerical, service and sales, professional and elementary
occupations gradually became female dominated in the Spanish labor market during
these years.39 From 1994 to 2013 the share of female workers in these occupations
increased by 15.6 percentage points for clerical occupations, 11.2 percentage points for
services and sales, 8.7 percentage points for professionals and 15.4 percentage points
for elementary occupations. Moreover, the largest share of the female labor force was
employed in services and elementary occupations or in professional occupations in all
years. On the other hand, women in the Spanish labor market seem to be less likely to
work as skilled agricultural and fishery workers, craft and related trades workers, plant
37 InSpain, in 1993 and1994 therewere fundamental changes in theNationalClassification ofOccupations,
making it impossible to compare pre and post-1994 data. In order to guarantee the homogeneity of the
occupation data and prevent errors that may arise from their re-classification, the period of analysis 1994–
2013.
38 We focus on 1994, 2004 and 2010 since, as we document in the next section, these are the years for
which we have data on wages.
39 Elementary occupations consist of simple and routine tasks which mainly require the use of hand-
held tools and often some physical effort, e.g. selling goods in streets and public places, or from door
to door; providing various street services; cleaning, taking care of apartment houses, hotels, offices and
other buildings, construction and manufacturing including product-sorting and simple hand-assembling of
components, etc. Professionals include science, engineering, health, teaching, business organization, legal,
social and human science professionals.
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and machine operators or assemblers. This possibly reflects the decline of agriculture
and manufacturing (sectors with male dominated occupations).40
A commonly-used measure of occupational segregation is the Duncan & Duncan
index of dissimilarity (ID), defined as
I Dt = 1
2
∑
i=1
|mit − fi t | ,
where mit and fi t are the fractions of the male and female labor force employed in
occupation i at time t .41 The index is interpreted as the percentage of female and
male workers that would have to change occupations in order for the employment
distributions ofmen andwomen to be identical. In other words, a value of 0% indicates
that the distribution of genders across occupations is identical, whereas a value of
100% implies that female andmale workers were concentrated in completely different
occupations. The Duncan and Duncan occupational segregation index was 34.78,
38.27, 36.50 and 36.22, for 1994, 2004, 2010 and 2013, respectively. The level of
occupational segregation has been fairly stable and implies that more than one third
of the male and female workers would have to change places across occupations so as
to have a perfectly equal distribution.
Dolado et al. (2001, 2004) use the European Labor Force Survey (1999) and the
Current Population Survey (1999) to examine the incidence and composition of female
employment both in the EU and in the US in 1999 as well as the differences across age
cohorts and educational levels. Their findings suggest that occupational segregation
in the EU is higher than in the US for highly educated women, particularly for women
aged 35–44, and Spain is not an exception.42 They also find that occupational segrega-
tion by gender is positively correlated with the share of part-time jobs in the economy.
Interestingly, their results reveal some discriminatory forces behind this choice as the
degree of job satisfaction by women is not high in part time jobs.
Brindusa et al. (2013) document a process of job polarization in recent years (1997–
2012) in Spain. In particular, there has been an increase in the share of occupations
at the low end of the wage distribution that cannot be accounted for changes in the
composition of the labor force. This process has affected males more strongly than
females since males have a higher concentration in occupations more intensive in
routine tasks.
3.2 Wages
We analyze next gender wage gaps. According to the OECD, the observed gender
wage gap in Spain was 11.8% in 2009, clearly below the 15.8% average for the
40 Gender segregation in tasks or specializations can also be observed even within a given occupation.
Dolado et al. (2012) study gender differences across research fields among academic economists.
41 For a discussion of this index, see Blau et al. (2002).
42 Moreover, their findings suggest that occupational segregation in Spain is much higher for the less
educated women, with the dissimilarity index taking a value around 50 percent for all age groups. On the
other hand, especially for the higher educated group the dissimilarity index is considerably higher for older
women, implying less occupational segregation for younger highly educated women in Spain in 1999.
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics
1994 2004 2010
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Number of observations 955 2060 3363 4654 3470 3929
Log hourly wage 1.944 2.018 1.892 2.040 2.161 2.239
(0.550) (0.514) (0.495) (0.497) (0.456) (0.444)
Education distribution (%)
Below upper secondary 40.8 54.4 30.6 43.6 23.7 35.4
Upper secondary 20.7 18.2 22.9 22.8 22.6 24.8
University 38.4 27.4 46.5 33.6 53.7 39.7
Immigrant 3.2 1.3 6.2 6.8 8.3 10.1
Labor market experience 15.755 19.514 14.847 18.698 15.678 18.856
(9.888) (10.511) (9.116) (9.797) (8.667) (9.229)
Part-time (%) 14.8 1.5 17.6 2.7 17.4 2.4
Source For 1994 sample, European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and for 2004 and 2010 samples,
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) cross-sectional components
OECD countries. In this section we explore in detail the sources of this gap and its
evolution from themid-nineties to today. To this end, we use the first wave of European
Community Household Panel (ECHP) for 1994, and the cross-sectional component
of European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for 2004
and 2010.43 We again focus on individuals of working age, between 25 and 54, with
valid observations on all the variables used in the employment and wage equations.
We exclude students, apprentices and the self-employed from the sample. For workers,
we further restrict the sample to individuals who are working at least 15h per week.44
Table6 provides the summary statistics for our sample. As we have already noted
above, educational attainment of the population increased between 1994 and 2010,
and there is now a larger fraction of females with a college degree. By the end of
the sample period, about 10% of the workforce consists of immigrants. On average
workers have between 15 (females) and 19 (males) years of labor market experience.
We start our analysis with standard Mincer regressions to isolate the mean gen-
der wage differential that is not accounted for by gender differentials in individuals’
observable characteristics (education, labor market experience, immigration status as
well as part-time/full-time status, occupation and industry). Then, in order to compare
male and female wages at different points of the wage distribution, we employ the
quantile regression technique. Furthermore we also present the results of the Oaxaca
(1973) decomposition based on the Mincer regressions to identify the separate effects
43 The advantage of using these surveys instead of the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (EES), the Spanish
Wage Structure Surveys, which is commonly used in the literature, is that the ECHP and EU-SILC allows
us to correct for the sample selection bias that can very significant.
44 This restriction is necessary because of the nature of ECHP, since ECHP does not distinguish individuals
regularly working less than 15h from those out-of the labor force in the first two waves.
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of these observable factors on gender wage differentials as well as the results of the
Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition based on the quantile regression estimates.
Finally, since participation in the labor market is not random, we try to control for
selection to obtain unbiased estimates of the gender wage gap. To this end, we estimate
a reduced-formmodel of the participation decision and then use Heckman’s correction
in the regressions for wages.
Mincer regressions: Our empirical specification is given by
lnWage = β0 + β1Female +
3∑
i=2
βi Edui + β4Exp + β5Exp
2
100
+β6Immigrant + β7Part − time
+
24∑
s=8
βsOccups−7 +
34∑
m=25
βmSecm−24 + u,
where lnWage is the natural logarithm of gross hourly wages, calculated as a sim-
ple division of monthly gross wage by monthly paid hours.45 Female is the gender
dummy variable that takes a value one if the worker is female and Edui stands for
two educational attainment dummies corresponding to secondary education and high
education levels (leaving out the low education as a reference category).46Exp rep-
resents labor market experience.47 I mmigrant is an indicator function that takes a
value of one if the country of birth is not Spain. Part-time is a dummy variable which
takes a value of one if the individual is employed part-time. Occups and Secm are the
eighteen occupation group dummies and twelve sector (economic activity) dummies
based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) and the
Statistical Classification of Economic Activities (NACE).
TheOrdinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation results are shown in Table7. The first
row of the table shows the gender wage gap under different specifications. We start
our analysis focusing on the observed gender gap, obtained by regressing log hourly
wages on a gender dummy without any additional controls. Then we run a simple
human capital wage regression that controls for the individual specific characteristics
(including a constant term and only the first five control variables) and finally move to
the expandedwagemodel that controls for thewhole set of control variables.As thefirst
45 Wages are deflated by using the harmonized consumer price index (HCPI = 2005) extracted fromOECD
Main Indicators database.
46 The education variable from ECHP and EU-SILC is harmonized by using the International Standard
Classification of Education (hereafter, ISCED) categories. High educational qualifications are defined as
ISCED categories 5-7, and include recognized third level education. Secondary education is defined by
ISCED categories 3 and 4, and includes all second stage of secondary level education. Low education
is defined as having no qualifications or only qualifications below the secondary education level, and
corresponds to ISCED categories 0–2.
47 EU-SILC provides the exact number of years spent in paid work. On the other hand, ECHP lacks the
information on actual labormarket experience. However it provides information about the age of individuals
at the highest level of education completed and at the beginning of the working life as well as the number
of continuous months of unemployment before current job. Using these variables we generate a proxy for
labor market experience.
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three columns of Table7 show, the observed gender gap increased from 7.5% in 1994
to 14.4% in 2004 but then declined to 7.8% in 2010. Once the observed characteristics
of women (simple model) are controlled, the gender wage gap is substantially higher
than the observed gender wage gap, which suggests that characteristics of women who
work help to reduce the gross wage gap with respect to men. When we also include
job characteristics (expanded model), the gender wage gap only changes only slightly.
According to the estimates using the expandedmodel, the gender wage gapwas 17.1%
in 1994 and declined to 14.3% in 2004 and to 10.8% in 2010.48
The results in Table7 also highlight some other aspects of the wage structure in
Spain. First, there is a wage penalty to be an immigrant. The penalty was 12% in
1994, declined to 6% in 2004 and increased again to 10% in 2010. Second, there was
not any penalty associated with part-time work in 1994 and 2004. A part-time work
penalty of 4% emerges in 2010, which suggest that labor market is becoming less
flexible and might partly reflect the effect of crisis in the labor market. Finally, skill
premium has been very stable between 1994 and 2010.
Quantile regressions: In order to investigate the gender wage gaps at different points
of the wage distribution, we also estimate a series of quantile regressions for 1994,
2002 and 2010. The quantile regressions technique, introduced byKoenker andBassett
(1978), seeks to extend the analysis to thewhole wage distribution and provides amore
complete picture of the covariate effects. The quantile regression estimation results for
various specifications are reported in Table8. Each panel in Table8 reports the quantile
regression estimation results for various specifications for 1994, 2004 and 2010. We
start again by estimating the observed gender gap and then move to the adjusted
gender gap obtained from the simple and expanded models. We present coefficient
estimates and standard errors of the female dummy in each specification for the fifth,
tenth, twenty-fifth, fiftieth, seventy-fifth, ninetieth and ninety-fifth percentiles. For
comparison, the mean OLS estimate of the gender dummy coefficient in each model
is also displayed in the last column of the table. The gender dummy coefficients in the
tables present the gender gap that remains unexplained at the various quantiles of the
wage distribution after controlling for the covariates in each specification.
As Table8 shows, all estimates are negative for each year and each specification,
which indicates the existence of a gender gap along the entire wage distribution in
Spain. The observed gender gap is highest at the bottom and at the top of the wage
distribution in 1994 and follows an inverse U-shape, which suggests the existence
of both sticky-floor and glass-ceiling effects. The inverse U-shape, however, starts
to disappear in 2004. This is mainly due to the increase of the gender wage gap
at the middle quantiles of the wage distribution. From 2004 to 2010, the observed
gender gap is decreasing in each quantile. The decrease at the bottom of the wage
distribution over these sixteen years is very significant; the gender gap at the 5th
quantile decreased from 0.16 to 0.08 between 1994 and 2010. The gender gap at the
95th quantile decreased from 0.10 to 0.06 between 1994 and 2010.When we move to
48 Hospido (2009) uses the European Community Household Panel 1994–2001 to study work histories of
young workers. She finds that there is a gender wage penalty associated to interruptions and to mobility,
which might be responsible for differences in early-career wage growth between men and women.
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the second and third rows of each panel in Table 8 and start adding controls for relevant
labor market characteristics this picture starts to change dramatically. First, the gender
dummy coefficient is increasing with quantiles for each year (glass-ceiling effect).
Hence, the gender wage gap that remains unexplained is higher in the upper tail of
the wage distribution than at the median and the lower tail. Moreover the sticky-floor
effect is also present in 2010. Second, the decline in the gender gap over time is now
much less visible. Indeed, for the expanded model, the gender gap increases between
1994 and 2010 for the lowest (5th percent) quantile.49
Oaxaca decomposition: In order to explore the relative weights of the factors causing
the gender wage differentials, we now display the Oaxaca decomposition results. The
basic idea is to split the observed gender gap into a part that can be explained by
gender differences in observed characteristics and an unexplained or residual part that
cannot be accounted for by such differences. The wage differential between males and
females can be written in the following way
X¯ femaleβˆ female − X¯maleβˆmale =
(
X¯ female − X¯male
)
βˆ
+
[
X¯ female
(
βˆ female − βˆ
)
+ X¯male
(
βˆ − βˆmale
)]
where X
f emale
and X
male
are the average attributes of the male and female workers,
βˆmale and βˆ f emale are the coefficient estimates from separate regressions for males
and females, and β̂ is a coefficient obtained from the pooled regression of males
and females.50 In this expression, the first term captures the gender gap that can be
accounted for by observed differences in labor market characteristics between females
and males, while the second term is the sum of female disadvantage plus the male
advantage. This term, the unexplained gender wage gap, is usually interpreted as a
measure of discrimination (although it can also capture potential effects of gender
differences in unobserved variables).
Table9 shows the results of the Oaxaca decomposition analysis based on the
expanded model. The first row shows the observed (unadjusted) gender gap. As we
have noted above, gender gap increased from 1994 to 2004 and decreased between
2004 and 2010.We find that the unexplained part of the observed gender wage gap has
49 De la Rica et al. (2008) perform a similar analysis for different levels of education attainment in Spain,
usingdata from theEuropeanCommunityHouseholdPanel. They show that for the college/tertiary education
group, the gender wage gap is higher at the upper tail than at the lower tail of the wage distribution. On the
other hand, they find that for the lower education group, the gap is much higher at the bottom than at the top
of the distribution, which they interpret as statistical discrimination by employers, due to low participation
rates of women in the lower education group. De la Rica et al. (2010) analyze the gender wage gap in the
performance–pay component of total hourly wages and its contribution to the overall gender gap in Spain.
After controlling for observable differences in individual and job characteristics as well as for non-random
selection, the adjusted gender gap in performance pay reaches 26 log points, displaying a glass-ceiling
pattern.
50 Note that if the model includes a constant, this would lead to a zero difference between the average
of the males’ and females’ characteristics with respect to this term. Otherwise, there would be a non-zero
constant difference, unless the constant terms are equal for the males and females regressions. This is why
there is a contribution of the constant term to the unexplained part whereas the contribution of the constant
to the explained part is zero.
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Table 9 Oaxaca decomposition of observed gender gap
1994 2004 2010
Observed gender gap −0.075∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.013) (0.013)
Explained 0.097∗∗∗ −0.001 0.033∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.009) (0.010)
Education 0.028∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Immigrant −0.002 0.000 0.002∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Experience −0.019∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Part-time 0.008∗ 0.001 −0.007∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Occupation 0.084∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.008) (0.007)
Sector 0.003 −0.012∗ 0.009∗
(0.015) (0.010) (0.005)
Unexplained −0.171∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.012) (0.012)
Education 0.010 −0.025 0.024
(0.030) (0.017) (0.017)
Immigrant −0.003 0.001 0.010∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Experience 0.032 −0.085∗∗∗ −0.050
(0.045) (0.031) (0.036)
Part-time −0.000 0.004 0.005∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Occupation 0.095 −0.135∗∗ 0.040
(0.102) (0.055) (0.051)
Sector 0.061 0.122∗∗ 0.047
(0.086) (0.054) (0.042)
Constant −0.367∗∗ −0.026 −0.186∗∗
(0.149) (0.083) (0.078)
Data Source For 1994 sample, European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and for 2004 and 2010
samples, European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) cross-sectional compo-
nents. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.*, ** and *** indicate significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10
significance level respectively
also decreased over these years. What is striking, however, is that the unexplained part
of the gender wage gap is much larger than the observed gender wage gap in each year.
Furthermore, the explained part of the gender wage gap is positive in 1994 and 2010
(insignificant in 2004), i.e. in spite of the advantageous condition of women in terms
of their labor market characteristics, the relative wage disadvantage of women persists
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mainly due to differences in the rewards to labor market characteristics. Although this
could be due to unobserved characteristics or factors that we fail to control for, it can
also reflect labor market discrimination against women. We next extend this analysis
to the entire wage distribution in Spain.51
Machado and Mata decomposition: Following the traditionalOaxaca (1973) decom-
position of effects onmeanwages,Machado andMata (2005) propose a decomposition
method combining quantile regressions and the bootstrapping approach. Like the Oax-
aca decomposition technique, theMachado-Mata decomposition calculates the relative
importance of observed characteristics and the coefficients on these characteristics at
different points of the wage distribution.
The difference between male and female wage distribution at the θ th quantile is
written as
Xfemaleβ̂ female (θ) − Xmaleβ̂male (θ)
=
(
Xfemale − Xmale
)
β̂male (θ) + Xfemale
[
β̂ female (θ) − β̂male (θ)
]
,
where βˆ(θ) is the θ th quantile regression coefficient. We again focus on the extended
model. First, we construct the counterfactual densities using the expanded model.
The counterfactual density is constructed assuming that women keep their own labor
market characteristics but they are rewarded for these characteristics as males are, the
(X f emaleβˆmale(θ)) term. This allows us to calculate two components of the difference
between the θ thquantile of the female wage distribution and the θ thquantile of the
male wage distribution: (i) the contribution of the differences in labor market charac-
teristics of female and male workers (the first term on the right hand side of the above
expression) and (ii) the contribution of the coefficients/rewards (the second term on
the right hand side of the above expression).
The results are presented in Fig. 16.52As we mentioned above, for all years we
observed gender wage gaps at each quantile of the wage distribution (Fig. 16a). Fur-
thermore, gender differences in rewards are responsible for the observed gender wage
gap, i.e. while the effects of labor market characteristics are usually positive, the effect
of coefficients are negative over the entire wage distribution, and, quantitatively, the
51 Using Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (EES) (Gardeazábal and Ugidos 2005) also report the unexplained
component to be 75 percent of the average gender wage gap in 1995. They also control for regional dummies
and the type of labor agreement that settles wages in the firm as controls. Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica
(2006), using the same data set, report that the raw gender gap decreased from 0.24 to 0.14 between 1995
and 2002.
52 The decomposition of differences in wage distributions is applied using the STATA command rqdeco
(See Melly (2007)). Melly (2006) shows that this procedure is numerically identical to the Machado and
Mata (2005) decomposition method when the number of simulations used in Machado and Mata procedure
goes to infinity. In the decomposition procedure of our study, rather than taking randomdraws from (0,1) and
estimating quantile regression coefficients, the decomposition is performed for the 99 percentile differences
in wages between men and women. 100 quantile regressions are estimated in the first step and the standard
errors for the counterfactual densities are obtained by repeating the procedure 100 times. Given the size of
the dataset and the computational limitations, it was not feasible to perform the decomposition on the whole
sample. Therefore, in this part of the analysis a random sample of the data consisting of 20% of the whole
data is used.
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Fig. 16 Decomposition of observed gender gap
second effect is more important than the first one. In 1994, the gender wage gap
is highest both at the bottom (glass-ceiling) and at the top of the wage distribution
(sticky-floor). While differences in returns are responsible for gaps at the bottom, the
observed gender gap at the top is mainly due to the increasing differences in char-
acteristics. This pattern is also seen in 2004 and in 2010 (Fig. 16b,c), although the
sticky-floor pattern is relatively less distinctive in both years while the glass-ceiling
effect remains significant.
Selection bias correction: Finally, in Table 10 we present estimates of the gender
wage gap after we control for self-selection of women into the labor market using the
standard Heckman correction. We find that for the extended model the wage gender
gap almost doubles in 2004 and 2010 when we control for selection: it is 18.0% in
1994, 29.1% in 2004 and 21.4% in 2010. These results indicate that there is strong
positive self-selection into the labor market and more productive women are the ones
who choose to work. This is consistent with Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) who find
that there exists a negative correlation between the gender wage gap and the gender
employment gap across countries. Hence in countries where there is a large gender
gap in employment, such as Spain, the observed gender gap is low since women who
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Table 10 Estimated gender wage gaps, the importance of selection
1994 2004 2010
Uncorrected estimates
Observed (unadjusted) −0.075*** −0.144*** −0.078***
(0.023) (0.013) (0.013)
Adjusted −0.171*** −0.143*** −0.108***
(0.019) (0.012) (0.012)
Corrected estimates
Observed (unadjusted) −0.084*** −0.291*** −0.181***
(0.057) (0.043) (0.019)
Adjusted −0.180*** −0.291*** −0.214***
(0.056) (0.042) (0.019)
Data Source For 1994 sample, European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and for 2004 and 2010
samples, European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) cross-sectional compo-
nents. (i) Observed gender gap is computed as the difference of the male and female average log hourly
wages obtained by estimating female dummy coefficient from regressing hourly wages only on a female
dummy and a constant term. (ii) Adjusted gender gap is computed as the difference of the male and female
average log hourly wages obtained by estimating female dummy coefficient from the expanded model, i.e.
by regressing hourly wages on a female dummy, education (two dummies), potential experience, and poten-
tial experience squared, immigrant dummy, part-time, occupation (18 dummies), sector (12 dummies), and
a constant term. (iii) Corrected estimates based on the Heckman’s two step consistent estimator. (iv) The
participation equation includes education (two dummies), age, immigrant dummy, marital status, number
of children, non-labor family income and a constant term. (v) Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *,
** and *** indicate significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance level respectively
work tend to have better labor markets skills than those who choose not to work.
The selection-corrected measured of the gender wage gap declined between 2004 and
2010, but the gap is still substantial and larger than its 1994 value.53
4 Conclusions
In this paperwe document recent trends in gender equality in employment andwages in
Spain. First our results show that the last few decades have witnessed a huge decline in
the gender gap in employment as women, in particular married women, have entered
the labor force. Our analysis shows that this is not just a result of compositional
changes in the population. There remain, however, significant differences between the
employment patterns of males and females, as females are less likely to work, and
if they do work they are more likely to be employed part time and with temporary
contracts. These differences are more pronounced for women with children younger
than 3. Female employment is also concentrated in lower paid jobs (such as cleri-
cal support and service and sales). Second, there have been several important policy
changes that try to help families reconcile family responsibilities with market work.
53 One reason for such improvements may be related to the way the recession took place in Spain, eroding
wages in sectors were the fraction of men is much higher than the fraction of women, such as construction.
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The existing literature suggests that households do react to incentives generated by dif-
ferent policies and policy changes are at least partly responsible for changes in female
labor supply. Another significant factor has been the large inflow of immigrants that
provided relatively cheap household services for more educated women and allowed
them to enter the labor market. Policy challenges, however, remain. The availability
and cost of child care is, as in many other countries, an important constraint on female
labor supply. Parental leave policies seem to be quite ineffective. Finally, there are sev-
eral aspects of the Spanish labor market, e.g. the way the working day is divided, that
place limits flexibility that is key for combining market and household work. Third,
female employment growth in Spain has occurred together with a dramatic decline in
fertility, and how labormarket and fertility decisions interact remains an open question
for future research.54 Fourth, and finally, the adjusted gender gap (after controlling
for worker and job characteristics as well as for selection) was about 20% in 2010
and not much different from its 1994 level. Furthermore, the gender gap in wages is
driven mainly by differences in returns to individual characteristics. While women
are more qualified than men in observable labor market characteristics, they end up
earning less. Our results also suggest that there are both sticky-floor and glass-ceiling
effects on female wages.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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